What would happen if the Federal Reserve were to change the assets in its portfolio?
I. The Model Framework
There are 5 agents in the model, banks (b), the Fed (f), the Treasury (t), households (h), and firms (m). There are 5 financial instruments in the model: (1) deposits at banks (D); (2) high-powered money (H), in the form of currency (C) and reserves (R); (3) government bonds (G); (4) private bonds (V) [you can think of private bonds held by households as corporate debt and private bonds held by banks as corporate loans]; and (5) discount window loans (W). Figure 1 shows the balance sheets of the agents. Note that all financial instruments are liabilities of at least one agent and assets of at least one agent, and the total amount of assets held by all agents must equal the total amount of liabilities for each instrument. Notation in this model follows the convention of Santomero, using lower-case abbreviations for agents and upper-case for instruments. For instrument I, the demand by agent j will be denoted Equilibrium comes about by changes in interest rates and quantities of assets. It's a short-run model, so we aren't worried about bigger issues. Imagine an equilibrium and we'll look at some comparative-static exercises. Since we won't be allowing income or wealth to change in these experiments, we won't include those in the model.
The Fed can increase the amount of high-powered money either by increasing the amount of non-borrowed reserves via open-market operations (buying either government bonds or private bonds in the open market) and via discount window loans (lending directly to banks).
Note that we're taking an aggregate view, thus not modeling the interbank (fed funds) market; so any shortage of reserves that banks want must be met by changes in interest rates to reduce the demand for reserves. Now for each of the demand and supply terms in the model, we need to find how they are related to the various interest rates (and other factors that won't change in this short-run model).
Demand for reserves:
¾ so reserve requirements are binding and no excess reserves are held.
Demand for government bonds: ( , , , )
-where the signs indicate the partial response of the variable to an increase in the argument above. Here the demand for government bonds by banks rises when the interest rate on government bonds rises (higher own return), but falls when the interest rate on private bonds rises (banks buy more private bonds and fewer government bonds) or when the bank must pay higher interest rates on deposits or discount loans (since then the cost of funds is higher, so the bank wants a smaller portfolio).
Demand for private bonds:
( , , , )
--similar to the case of government bonds.
Supply of deposits:
--when returns to bank assets rise, the bank will want more deposits; when the interest rate on deposits rises it will want fewer deposits; when the interest rate on discount loans rises, it will want more deposits to replace discount loans, if it has any outstanding.
Demand for discount loans: ( , , , )
--same factors as supply of deposits, but with opposite effects due to changes in rate on deposits or discount rate.
Fed:
We take Fed actions to be exogenous; given some equilibrium, we're going to see what happens in a comparative-static sense when the Fed changes its assets and liabilities, assuming monetary policy targets an interest rate, as discussed below.
Household:
Households substitute between deposits, currency, government bonds, and private bonds, depending on the relative returns to each. A higher own return increases demand, while a higher return on an alternative assets decreases demand. So the demands for each are:
Demand for deposits:
( , , )
Demand for government bonds:
For now, we take capital and the amount of private bonds issued as exogenous. If we consider more complicated issues, such as the issuance by government-sponsored enterprises of additional bonds when their relative returns decline, this assumption must be changed. But for now, s m V is taken to be exogenous.
Treasury:
We assume that Treasury issuance of government bonds, s t G , is exogenous. An earlier version of this model assumed that any change in bond issues must be offset by an equal change in deposits, d t D . But that's not really appropriate. The decline in government debt occurs because the government has essentially received a surprise increase in net wealth (i.e., tax receipts and unexpectedly higher and expenditures unexpectedly lower than they were before). However, this fact must be reflected in real economic activity (i.e., households or firms must have higher capital or net wealth than before) as well, analysis of which is going to require a more complete model of real activity. Thus, it makes sense at this point to simply do a differential analysis on the Fed's portfolio.
In this version, in order to examine just the differential effect from the Fed's portfolio decision, we'll take the supply of government bonds as exogenous.
Equilibrium:
We assume that an equilibrium exists in which all the equations describing demand and supply are determined, all the budget constraints are satisfied, and there's a unique equilibrium in the return variables, r D , r G , r V , and r W . (1)
The Fed does open-market operations in private bonds to hit its interest-rate target.
(2) The Fed substitutes a new discount loan mechanism by which discount loans substitute for government bonds on the Fed's balance sheet and are supplied to banks elastically at the interest rate r W .
The Discount Window: To keep things simple, we assume that case (1) involves mechanisms in place today, and that the discount window is prohibitively expensive for banks. Thus there is no discount window borrowing. In case (2), we assume the Fed has in place a simple discount window mechanism allowing banks to borrow all they want at the discount rate (the NACF, nonadministered credit facility).
Spell it out in the model:
Now, let's think about what goes on in each market:
Deposits: ( , , ) ( , , , )
An increase in the return to government or private bonds decreases household demand for deposits and increases bank supply of deposits, so excess demand for deposits decreases. A higher interest rate on deposits increases household demand for deposits and decreases the bank's supply of deposits, so the excess demand for deposits rises. An increase in Treasury deposits increases excess demand. Thus, we can summarize the deposit market with the excess demand function (ignoring the effect of changes in the discount rate):
( , , , , ) 0
High-powered money:
( , , , ) ( , , )
The demand for high-powered money is split into two parts: currency demand by households and reserve demand by banks. The Fed operates by affecting the supply of high-powered money, thus influencing interest rates. In the market for high-powered money, the excess demand is given by:
Note that higher returns to government or private bonds lead banks to earn a higher return on their assets, so they want to attract more deposits, so they demand more reserves, hence more high-powered money, but households demand less currency and deposits, hence less high-powered money; so the signs of the first two arguments are ambiguous. Higher deposit interest rates lead banks to offer fewer deposits, so they need fewer reserves, and households want to hold less currency, so the demand for high-powered money is lower. And, of course, when the Fed supplies more reserves, excess demand for reserves declines.
Government bonds: ( , , , ) ( , , )
Higher returns to government bonds will increase the demand by both banks and households for the bonds. Higher returns to private bonds will have the opposite effect. When the return to deposits rises, households and banks want to hold fewer government bonds. Thus the excess demand for government bonds is:
( , , , , , ) 0
Higher returns to private bonds will increase the demand by both banks and households for the bonds. Higher returns to government bonds will have the opposite effect. When the return to deposits rises, households and banks want to hold fewer private bonds. Thus the excess demand for private bonds is:
( , , , , , ) 0 In all three cases, the Fed's reduction in demand for government debt is modeled as:
This change in the Fed's balance sheet is offset by a Fed action to keep the interest rate on deposits unchanged:
(1) Open-market operations in private securities:
or (2) Discount window loans:
In both cases, we'll totally differentiate the excess demand equations and see if we can solve for a deterministic equilibrium.
Totally differentiate the functions G, D, and V:
Note that the excess demand functions are affected one-for-one by changes in supply or demand,
II. Fed Portfolio Shift with No Change in Interest Rate on Deposits
In this section, we model the results when the Fed's portfolio shifts in such a way that the deposit interest rate is unchanged.
Case 1: Open-Market Operations in Private Securities
System of 3 equations in 3 unknowns: Results of derivations:
The sign of a g + is unclear, since it depends on the relative size of different effects.
Thus we don't know if high-powered money increases or decreases. But we do know that the Fed buys private bonds and sells government bonds; we just don't know which quantity is larger. Results of derivations:
The term V dr can't be signed, so we don't know if the return to private bonds will rise or fall. 
,
which is positive if the main effect is from the 5 W term. D is endogenous but banks supply all the deposit accounts that are opened at a given deposit rate.
Government bonds:
Private bonds:
V is determined passively such that the return on deposits plus a constant equals the return on private bonds. Included in the special assumptions are that 0
Case 1a: OMO in Private Securities
With the special assumptions in place, when the Fed reduces its demand for government bonds and increases its demand for private bonds, doing so in a way that leaves the interest rate on private bonds unchanged (because 0 V D dr dr = = ), the following results are obtained:
The changes in the budget constraints of the agents are:
Bank:
High-powered money: Since 0 and 0, then 0.
Private bonds: From the bank's budget constraint, since reserves decline less than deposits, banks must hold fewer private bonds, so 0. 
Additional Restrictions:
Under another set of assumptions considered, demand by households for currency and deposits is exogenous. Imposing those conditions here would mean that 0 and 0.
In this situation, the banking system expands.
Discount loans: Assuming the direct effect from the Fed's reduction in demand for government bonds exceeds the impact on the monetary base (a very likely event), then 0.
IV. Generalizing the Problem with an Unchanged Monetary Base
Suppose we now wish to get rid of the restriction that 0 D dr = . This makes the problem much more difficult to solve algebraically, because now there's one more term to solve for.
However, we then use a new assumption about Fed policy, which puts another restriction on the system-either we assume the Fed does not allow the monetary base to change, or we assume that the discount rate doesn't change. We consider 3 new cases, related to the 2 previous cases:
Case 1b: Private bonds case:
In this case, the Fed demands fewer government bonds and replaces them with private bonds, with no change in the monetary base and no discount window in operation.
Case 2b: Discount window-NACF case:
Case 2c: Discount window-ACF case (ACF = auction credit facility):
System of 3 equations in 3 unknowns:
The sign of this is hard to figure out, because the terms point in opposite directions. The numerator is positive if 2 2 V G > , which seems likely since 2 V is an own effect (
The denominator is much more complicated, consisting of six third-order terms. Of these 6, 5 are negative and 1 is positive. However, the one term that's positive is the only own effect ( 3 1 2
, so this may be larger in value then all the other cross effects, in which case the denominator is positive. This type of assumption is one that we often make in comparative statics exercises using graphical analysis. But we should be careful because those cross partials here must also reflect budget constraints, so judging their magnitude can be difficult. Nonetheless, if these assumptions hold, then 0
Other results:
If we make the same assumptions that we made above, and if we further assume that 1 1
G V >
and that 3 1
, which again may be reasonable if the own effects are much larger in magnitude than the cross effects, then 0 V dr < . This is intuitive since the demand for private bonds is increasing.
Unfortunately, there's no intuition on the sign of the change in the interest rate on deposits.
Different effects point in different directions, and the sign depends on relative magnitudes.
Banks substitute some government bonds for some private bonds, given the direction of change of returns, but it's impossible to tell whether banks' assets overall increase or decline, since we can't tell if deposits increase or decrease.
System of 4 equations in 4 unknowns: 
Both V dr and D dr are positive, under the assumptions made above. People's demand for deposit accounts could rise or fall, depending on how they respond in comparing the higher yield on government bonds and private bonds to the higher yield on deposits. 
This term is most likely positive, though not definitively (5 of the 6 terms in the numerator have the same sign). But to know whether the monetary base rises or falls, we need to know whether a g + is positive or negative, which is impossible to tell.
With returns on government bonds, private bonds, and deposits all rising, people will hold less currency. But we don't know if the monetary base rises or falls. If it rises, then given that there's less currency held, there must be more reserves held against more deposits. In that case, the banking system must get bigger. But if the monetary base declines, which happens if deposits decline sufficiently, then we wouldn't be able to tell if the banking system's assets would increase or decrease.
Case 2c: Discount window-ACF case:
This is quite a complicated system. If we assume that the own effects dominate, as we did earlier, then it suggests that both numerator and denominator are negative, so 0 G dr > . 
This is clearly not signable, and there are no own effects, so it's impossible to sign V dr . 
Again, there are no own effects in the numerator, so it can't be signed. 
Here, there's an own effect, and if it dominates the other terms, then 0
All the results here are quite tentative, for they depend on somewhat dubious assumptions.
Whether the banking system expands or contracts here is hard to say. We know that the banking system takes out more discount loans, equal to the decrease in the demand for government bonds by the Fed. But do those discount loans displace more or fewer deposits? Since funding is becoming more expensive, banks may wish to reduce the size of their portfolio; on the other hand, returns are higher, so they may wish to expand. Households may substitute government bonds for deposit accounts, as well. 
V. SUMMARY

